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"[A]cts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly availa-
ble goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that govern-
ment has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point of
view such conduct may transmit. "'
I. INTRODUCTION-ELANE PHOTOGRAPHY V. WILLOCK
As an artist, Elaine Huguenin uses her camera to memorialize the im-
portant moments in her clients' lives.2 Whether capturing the loving
glance of a bride at her new husband or a high school senior's triumphant
smile, Huguenin puts her heart into her work.' She views her photo-
graphs as a personal expression of herself and a way to communicate her
ideas and feelings to the world.4 For that reason, she will not take pic-
1. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
2. Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the New Mexico Human Rights
Commission at 1-2, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (2d
Jud. Dist. N.M. June 30, 2008), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/ElanePhoto
Appeal.pdf. Elaine Huguenin and her husband Jon own Elane Photography. which is lo-
cated in Bernalillo County, New Mexico. Id. at 1. The difference in spelling between
"Elaine" Huguenin and "Elane" Photography is deliberate and not a typo.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id.
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tures of acts she does not condone, for example, individuals in the nude
or macabre horror scenes.5
In addition to being a photographer, Huguenin is also a Christian who
believes that marriage represents a sacred union between one man and
one woman.' So when Vanessa Willock asked Huguenin to photograph
her same-sex commitment ceremony, Huguenin felt she was within her
rights to decline.7 The Human Rights Commission of New Mexico dis-
agreed, found Elane Photography guilty of discrimination, and ordered
the company to pay $6637.94 for Willock's attorney's fees.8 In its final
order, the Commission declared that Elane Photography "discriminated
against [Willock] because of sexual orientation in violation of Section 28-
1-7(F) of the New Mexico Human Rights Act."9
Willock argued that Elane Photography is a public accommodation
and, as such, cannot discriminate against her and her same-sex partner
under New Mexico law.' ° By refusing to accept Willock's business be-
cause it would have to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony,
Elane Photography engaged in unlawful discrimination against Willock
based on her sexual orientation."' The organization that defended Elane
5. Id. at 2-3. Huguenin also refuses to photograph anything that would appear to
condone abortion, pornography, unmarried cohabitation, polygamy, no-fault divorce, or
same-sex marriage. Id. at 3.
6. Id. at 3-4.
7. Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the New Mexico Human Rights
Commission at 3-4, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (2d
Jud. Dist. N.M. June 30, 2008), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/ElanePhoto
Appeal.pdf. On September 21, 2006, Vanessa Willock emailed Elaine Huguenin, request-
ing pricing information and asking if Elane Photography would be willing to photograph
Willock's lesbian commitment ceremony. Id. at 3. Huguenin responded with an email
stating that her company only photographed "traditional" weddings. Id. When Willock
wrote back seeking clarification as to whether Huguenin refused to offer her services to
same-sex couples, Huguenin replied, "Yes, you are correct in saying we do not photograph
same-sex weddings." Id. at 4.
8. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, at 19 (Human Rights
Comm'n of N.M. Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/2008/jun/
photography.pdf.
9. Id.; see also N.M. S-rAr. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2009) (outlawing discrimination in
public accommodations). It is an unlawful practice for:
any person in any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly or indirectly,
in offering or refusing to offer its services, facilities, accommodations or goods to any
person because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, gender identity, spousal affiliation or physical or mental handicap, provided that
the physical or mental handicap is unrelated to a person's ability to acquire or rent
and maintain particular real property or housing accommodation.
§ 28-1-7.
10. Elane Photography, at 8.
11. Id. at 19.
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Photography is the Alliance Defense Fund (ADF), a non-profit organiza-
tion committed to "aggressively defend[ing] religious liberty."' 2 Among
the ADF's patron issues are "guarding the sanctity of human life," "pro-
tecting marriage and the family," and "defending religious freedom."' 3
The ADF legal team's principal arguments were: (1) Elane Photography
is not a public accommodation, and (2) Elane Photography's owners did
not engage in discrimination based on sexual orientation.' 4 Furthermore,
the ADF also claimed that enforcement of the New Mexico Human
Rights Act against Elane Photography's owners violated their rights to
free speech and free exercise of religion. 5 In essence, the ADF argued
that the state should not force Elane Photography's owners to participate
in a ceremony that advances a view with which they disagree, in this case,
same-sex marriage."
Elane Photography presents a complicated case because it involves
both an individual, Elaine Huguenin, and a business, Elane Photography.
At issue in Elane Photography was an "unwritten company policy" that
"Elane Photography would not photograph any image or event which
was contrary to the religious beliefs of its co-owners [Elaine Huguenin
and her husband, Jonathan Huguenin]."' 7 The problem with having such
a policy is that it takes an individual's rights to free speech and free exer-
cise of religion and ascribes them to a business, which is subject to anti-
discrimination laws that may at times burden those freedoms. To under-
stand why the decision of the New Mexico Human Rights Commission
should be affirmed on appeal, it is important to understand who (or what)
exactly has First Amendment rights.
Elaine Huguenin, as an American citizen, has the right to attend
whatever church she pleases, educate her family in the ways of her relig-
ion, and even take photographs expressing her religious beliefs without
government interference. 8 Elane Photography, however, is considered a
12. ADF: Purpose - Alliance Defense Fund - Defending Our First Liberty, http://
www.alliancedefensefund.org/about/purpose (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
13. ADF: Issues - Alliance Defense Fund - Defending Our First Liberty, http://www.
alliancedefensefund.org/about/purpose (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
14. Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the New Mexico Human Rights
Commission at 5, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (2d Jud.
Dist. N.M. June 30, 2008), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/ElanePhotoAp-
peal.pdf.
15. Id. at 5-6 (arguing that the Commission's decision and order forced Elane Photog-
raphy "to participate in and advance a viewpoint it would not do so absent government
coercion by the Commission").
16. Id. at 5.
17. Elane Photography, at 4.
18. U.S. CONsT. amend. i, § 1.
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public accommodation under New Mexico law.19 As a public accommo-
dation, Elane Photography is subject to the New Mexico Human Rights
Act, which protects individuals from discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation or gender identity. 20 Therefore, Elaine Huguenin may espouse
certain views, but under the laws of New Mexico, Elane Photography
may not discriminate against customers based on Huguenin's beliefs.
One of the questions I will tackle in this Comment is to what extent do
religious beliefs, associational rights, and the right to freely exercise one's
conscience constitute defenses to those seeking to deny others access to
public accommodations? If the facts of the case were different and Elane
Photography refused to photograph a Jewish wedding or an interracial
wedding, even if those unions were against Huguenin's faith, there would
be no question that the business could not legally discriminate based on
customers' race or religion.2 Just as there are limits on free speech, there
are limits on the free exercise of religion.22 The law protects Huguenin's
free exercise of religion and free speech as an individual, but the conduct
of Elane Photography remains subject to state anti-discrimination laws
and other federal and state regulations.
While the majority of this Comment focuses on discrimination chal-
lenges brought by members of the LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender) community, access to public accommodations affects a much
broader portion of society. Essentially anyone, from bikers in Texas,23 to
19. Elane Photography, at 16. The statutory definition of a public accommodation
does "not exclude a business entity which is by its nature expressive and artistic." Id. at 15.
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2009).
21. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (up-
holding federal legislation prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations based on
race): cf Shawn Nottingham, Louisiana Justice Who Refused Interracial Marriage Resigns,
CNN, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/11/03/louisiana.interracial.marriage (re-
porting the resignation of a Louisiana justice of the peace who famously refused to marry
an interracial couple in 2009). Keith Bardwell claimed that "he was concerned for the
children that might be born of the [interracial] relationship and that, in his experience,
most interracial marriages don't last." Shawn Nottingham, Louisiana Justice Who Refused
Interracial Marriage Resigns, CNN, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/ll/03/louisi-
ana.interracial.marriage. Facing national backlash and a discrimination lawsuit brought by
one of the couples he refused to marry, Bardwell resigned his position as a justice of the
peace. Id.
22. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (holding that while the First
Amendment grants the absolute freedom to believe, it does not permit absolute freedom
to act); cf Hayley Ellison, Free Exercise of the Courtroom: Why Perpetrators of Religiously
Motivated Violence Can No Longer Hide Behind the First Amendment, 12 SCHOLAR 95, 104
(2009) (arguing for limitation of the free exercise defense in cases involving violence
against parishioners, particularly women and children).
23. Tex. H.B. 1569. 81st Leg., R.S. (2009), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/81R/billtext/pdf/HBO15691.pdf. The proposed bill stipulates:
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women seeking health care coverage for contraceptives, 4 to single
mothers,2 5 could become victims of discrimination based on business
owners' religious views. My ultimate goal is to propose a solution that
reconciles these competing interests-the freedom to run one's business
without excessive government intrusion on the one hand, and the right of
individuals to be free from discrimination on the other.
In order to illustrate the need for more legislation protecting citizens
from discrimination in public accommodations and for limiting First
Amendment justifications for such discrimination, I will discuss several
current cases similar to Elane Photography. Part I of this Comment will
present the relevant legal background and history of discrimination in
public accommodations. Beginning with Romer v. Evans in 1995, this
Comment will follow the modern history of the fight for LGBT equality.
Part II will focus on the reasons why states should limit First Amendment
justifications for discrimination and why states should prohibit discrimi-
nation in public accommodation based on sexual orientation and gender
identity. Some states, like New Mexico 6 and California,2 7 have already
incorporated sexual orientation into their human rights statutes. Similar
to employment anti-discrimination statutes,28 these typically exempt re-
ligious organizations with ministerial positions from compliance. The
most controversial cases are those involving individuals who are not ex-
A person [who] owns or operates a public accommodation may not restrict an individ-
ual from access or admission to the accommodation or otherwise prevent the individ-
ual from using the accommodation solely ... because the individual: (A) operates a
motorcycle: (B) is a member of an organization or association that operates
motorcycles; or (C) wears clothing that displays the name of an organization or
association.
Id.
24. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Dep't of Managed Health Care, 85 P.3d
67, 89 (Cal. 2004) (upholding a California law requiring employers that provide health
insurance prescription coverage for their employees to include contraceptives as part of the
plan).
25. E.E.O.C. v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1364 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that a Christian school's policy of withholding health insurance from employees who were
single mothers or otherwise not "heads of household" violated the Equal Pay Act and Title
VII).
26. N.M. STrAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2009).
27. CAL. CiV. CooE § 51(b) (West 2009).
28. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong.
§ 3(a)(4)(A) (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi
?dbname=l 11 _cong__bills&docid=f:h3017ih.txt.pdf (excluding small businesses, tax-exempt
private clubs, the military, and religious organizations from compliance with the proposed
act to prohibit employment discrimination against gays and lesbians).
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empt by statute but who still wish to exercise their religious or moral
beliefs in the operation of their businesses or private organizations.2 9
The tension between religious freedom and free speech on the one
hand and LGBT rights on the other is an issue that has bitterly divided
the country in recent years. Same-sex marriage often takes center stage
in the debate, but discrimination in public accommodations is becoming a
hotly contested issue as well. On December 7, 2009, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to hear the case of Christian Legal Society Chapter of
University of California v. Kane, a case involving a Christian student
group's right to discriminate in choosing its members and officers based
on their sexual orientation and religious views.3 ° Members of the group
sought to exclude others who did not share their Christian beliefs, which
violated the University of California's anti-discrimination policy.3 That
case will be discussed in detail later on in this Comment, but, for now, it
demonstrates that discrimination in public accommodations is a relevant
issue for more than just the LGBT community.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND-THE STATE OF PUBLIC
AcCOMMODATIONs LAW TODAY
According to the Human Rights Campaign, 32 "Non-discrimination law
in thirteen states and the District of Columbia bans discrimination based
on sexual orientation and gender identity in public accommodations. 33
An additional seven states also ban discrimination based on sexual orien-
29. See. e.g., Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ.,
536 A.2d 1,39 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring a private Jesuit college to allow a LGBT student
group the benefits of access to the school's facilities and services); Christian Legal Soc'y
Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW, 2006 WL 997217, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal.
2006) (upholding a university decision denying a religious student organization school
funding because the organization discriminated in the selection of its members based on
both religion and sexual orientation), affd. 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted sub non. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez. 130 S.Ct. 795
(Dec. 7, 2009) (No. 08-1371); N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, Inc. v. Benitez, 189
P.3d 959, 962 (Cal. 2008) (holding that doctors may not refuse treatment to an individual
based on the doctors' religious opposition to that individual's sexual orientation).
30. Christian Legal Soc'y, 2006 WL 997217, at *1.
31. Id. at *3-4.
32. HRC - About Us, http://www.hrc.org/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16,
2009). The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) is a group that lobbies for lesbian, gay, bisex-
ual, and transgender rights. Id. "HRC strives to end discrimination against LGBT citizens
and realize a nation that achieves fundamental fairness and equality for all." Id.
33. HRC - Patient Non-Discrimination and State Public Accommodation Law, http:/
/www.hrc.org/issues/12641.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Illinois, Iowa. Maine. Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Ver-
mont, and Washington).
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tation, excluding discrimination based on gender identity.34 The statute
at issue in Elane Photography was the New Mexico Human Rights Act,
which protects individuals from discrimination based on both their gen-
der identity and sexual orientation.35 The New Mexico statute defines a
public accommodation as "any establishment that provides or offers its
services, facilities, accommodations or goods to the public, but does not
include a bona fide private club or other place or establishment that is by
its nature and use distinctly private."3" In New Mexico, it is unlawful for
"any person in any public accommodation to make a distinction, directly
or indirectly, in offering or refusing to offer its services, facilities, accom-
modations or goods to any person because of race, religion, color, na-
tional origin, ancestry, sex, sexual orientation, [or] gender identity. 37
California has a similar statute known as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.38
According to the Unruh Civil Rights Act:
All persons within the jurisdiction of [California] are free and equal,
and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, disability, medical condition, marital status, or sexual orienta-
tion are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages,
facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of
every kind whatsoever.
In contrast, Texas and twenty-nine other states offer no statutory pro-
tection for the LGBT community in the realm of public accommoda-
tions. 40 Interestingly, a bill that was left pending in the Texas legislature
34. HRC - Patient Non-Discrimination and State Public Accommodation Law, http:/
/www.hrc.org/issues/12641.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (Connecticut, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, and Wisconsin).
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2009).
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 2009).
39. Id. § 51(b) (emphasis added). The act extends protection not only to actual gay
and lesbian Californians, but to any person perceived to be gay or lesbian and to any
person perceived to be "associated with a person who has, or is perceived" to be gay or
lesbian. Id. § 51(e)(5).
40. HRC - Patient Non-Discrimination and State Public Accommodation Law, http:/
/www.hrc.org/issues/1264t.htm (last visited Apr. 16. 2010) (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Ar-
kansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia. Idaho. Indiana. Kansas, Kentucky. Louisiana, Michi-
gan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota. Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
West Virginia, and Wyoming). It is worth pointing out, however, that not all members of
the Texas legislature favor continued discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity. See HB 538 by Villarreal, http://www.equalitytexas.org/content.aspx?id=566 (last
visited Apr. 16, 2010) (discussing legislation co-authored by Texas Representatives Mike
Villarreal, Ellen Cohen. Alma Allen, Lon Burman. and Jessica Farrar, which would pro-
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at the close of the last regular session proposes offering protection to
motorcyclists against discrimination in public accommodations.4 The
relevant language of the proposed bill states:
A person [who] owns or operates a public accommodation may not
restrict an individual from access or admission to the accommodation
or otherwise prevent the individual from using the accommodation
solely: (1) because of the race, creed, sex, religion, or national origin
of the individual; or (2) because the individual (A) operates a motor-
cycle, (B) is a member of an organization or association that operates
motorcycles, or (C) wears clothing that displays the name of an organ-
ization or association.42
Despite the fact that some Texas legislators deem bikers worthy of more
protection than gays and lesbians, the need for this law highlights the fact
that discrimination in public accommodations is not a problem facing the
LGBT community alone. Rather, discrimination in public accommoda-
tions is an issue with a broad impact on diverse members of society.
A. Animus Is No Excuse-The Story of Romer v. Evans
Although the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans4 3 almost fifteen
years ago, the case remains a helpful lens through which to view the fight
for LGBT equality under the law.4 4 Several cities, including Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver, "enacted ordinances that listed 'sexual orientation'
as an impermissible ground for discrimination, equating the moral disap-
proval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry."45 In re-
sponse to these ordinances, Colorado passed Amendment 2 in order to
ban "all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state or
local government designed to protect . . . homosexual persons."46 The
United States Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2, finding it a vio-
lation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 7
vide protection against discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity).
41. Tex. H.B. 1569, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/
tlodocs/81 R/billtext/pdf/HBO15691.pdf.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
44. AMy D. RONNER, HOMOPHOBIA AND THE LAW 11 (2005) (explaining that the de-
cision's lasting significance is that it "created an equal protection rationale that could infil-
trate diverse areas of law and help alleviate discrimination"). Thus, "the Romer reasoning
provides a decent basis for future equal protection challenges to [discriminatory] laws." Id.
45. Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 624 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 632-35.
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Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, offered two reasons why
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause:
First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a broad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an excep-
tional and, as we shall explain, invalid form of legislation. Second, its
sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that
the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward
the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests. 48
Thus, the Supreme Court found animus against a group to be no excuse
for treating its members as second-class citizens.4 9
Scholars have recognized the historical significance of the Romer deci-
sion, noting that the case acknowledged "that the widespread animus
against gays (which is not the same as moral objection to homosexual
conduct) undermines, to an extent that is hard to determine, the credibil-
ity of such explanations. The constitutional status of laws that discrimi-
nate against gays, therefore, is uncertain after Romer."
50
Of equal historical impact was Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer. Con-
trary to the majority opinion, Scalia insisted that all Amendment 2's
drafters sought to do was to prevent homosexuals from receiving prefer-
ential treatment: "The amendment prohibits special treatment of homo-
sexuals, and nothing more." 5' Rather than accepting the majority view
that Amendment 2 was the product of animus toward homosexuals,
Scalia contended that Amendment 2 was "rather a modest attempt by
seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise those mores
through use of the laws."52
Scalia's dissent in Romer helps to frame the issue of discrimination in
public accommodations. As I will demonstrate in the latter pages of this
Comment, the discrimination that occurred in Colorado with the passage
of Amendment 2 and in the cases that followed was anything but inno-
cent action against a "politically powerful minority."
48. Id. at 632.
49. Id. at 633-34.
50. ANDREW KOPI'ELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUEsTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERI-
CAN LAW 7 (2002). Subsequently, laws seeking to discriminate against the homosexual
community will "always arouse suspicion that they rest on a bare desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group." Id. at 6.
51. Romer, 517 U.S. at 638 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
52. Id. at 636.
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B. Why Not a Federal Solution?
In Romer, the majority explained why any federal solution would be
inadequate to resolve the issue of discrimination in public accommoda-
tions. The Court pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
grant Congress the power to disallow discrimination in public accommo-
dations.5 3 In the face of all this, the Court explained that "most [s]tates
have chosen to counter discrimination by enacting detailed statutory
schemes."5 4 But notwithstanding the Romer majority's assertion that the
federal government can do little in the realm of public accommodations,
Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that "[a]ll persons shall
be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the ground
of race, color, religion, or national origin."55 Currently, there has been
no amendment to add sexual orientation or gender identity to the list of
protected classes under the federal Civil Rights Act.5 6
C. Constitutional Defenses to Discrimination
Individuals seeking to discriminate against others based on their sexual
orientation or gender identity have advanced three main arguments. The
first of these arguments is the First Amendment free exercise of religion
argument. The second argument, the right to peaceably assemble, also
has its roots in the First Amendment. Finally, the third argument comes
from the right to free exercise of conscience, which has its origins in state
statutes and, more recently, in federal legislation:"
53. Id. at 627-28 (majority opinion).
54. Id. at 628.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006).
56. But see Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 11 1th Cong. (tst
Sess. 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname4111-
cong-bills&docid=f:h30t7ih.txt.pdf (proscribing discrimination against LGBT people in
employment): Military Readiness Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. Res. 1283, 111 th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
1 lcong.bills&docid=f:h1283ih.txt.pdf (proposing a replacement for the military's "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell" policy regarding homosexual servicemembers).
57. See Saundra Young, White House Set to Reverse Health Care Conscience Clause,
CNN. Feb. 27. 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/27/conscience.rollback/in-
dex.html (explaining that under the Provider Refusal Rule, or the so-called "conscience
clause," "workers in health-care settings-from doctors to janitors-can refuse to provide
services, information or advice to patients on subjects such as contraception, family plan-
ning, blood transfusions and even vaccine counseling if they are morally against it").
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i. Free Exercise of Religion-Elane Photography v. Willock
In its appeal from the lower court ruling, Elane Photography asserts
several reasons for its refusal to photograph Willock's same-sex commit-
ment ceremony. 58 Among those arguments is owner Elaine Huguenin's
right to freely exercise her Christian faith under the First Amendment.59
When Huguenin refused to accept Willock's request to obtain Elane Pho-
tography's services, Huguenin reasoned that she was simply exercising
her right to express her religious beliefs as she pleased.6" As evidence,
Huguenin stated that she and her husband had an "unwritten" policy at
Elane Photography to only photograph people and situations that com-
port with their views as Christians.6 1 Refusing to photograph a same-sex
commitment ceremony, Huguenin insists, is like refusing to photograph
graphic horror scenes or pornographic acts.6" She does not take pictures
of those things, so why should she have to photograph a lesbian wedding
she also believes is immoral?
ii. Free Association-Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston6 3
provides an example of a situation where a free association argument
may prevail against a public accommodations discrimination claim. In
Hurley, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
(GLIB) wanted to march with other groups in a St. Patrick's Day parade
organized by the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council (Veterans
Council).64 The Veterans Council, however, objected to marching along-
side GLIB in the parade.6 5 GLIB brought suit, claiming that the Veter-
ans Council discriminated against it based on its members' sexual
58. Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the New Mexico Human Rights
Commission at 5, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (2d Jud.
Dist. N.M. June 30, 2008), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/ElanePhotoAp-
peal.pdf.
59. Id. at 6 (claiming that Elane Photography's refusal to photograph Willock's com-
mitment ceremony was a form of religious expression protected by the First Amendment).
60. Id. at 3.
61. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, at 4 (Human Rights
Comm'n of N.M. Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/2008/Jun/
photography.pdf.
62. Appeal from the Decision and Final Order of the New Mexico Human Rights
Commission at 2, Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (2d Jud.
Dist. N.M. June 30, 2008), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/ElanePhotoAp-
peal.pdf.
63. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
64. Id. at 561.
65. Id.
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orientation in violation of a Massachusetts law forbidding discrimination
in public accommodations.66 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court's ruling in favor of GLIB, reasoning that:
The state court's application ... had the effect of declaring [the Vet-
erans Council's] speech itself to be the public accommodation. Since
every participating parade unit affects the message conveyed by the
private organizers, the state court's peculiar application of the Mas-
sachusetts law essentially forced the [Veterans] Council to alter the
parade's expressive content and thereby violated the fundamental
First Amendment rule that a speaker has the autonomy to choose
the content of his own message and, conversely, to decide what not
to say.
67
Had the Court forced the Veterans Council to include a group that
espoused a view with which the Veterans Council disagreed, that would
have altered the Veterans Council's speech and infringed upon its right to
free speech and free association under the First Amendment. 68 The Su-
preme Court decided that the government cannot force a private group to
alter its speech in order to endorse a message with which the group
disagrees.69
Hurley may be distinguished from Elane Photography in that the Vet-
erans Council was a private organization engaged in an act of free speech
and association, whereas Elane Photography is a business that offers its
services to the public. Since Elane Photography is not a church or a pri-
vate club, nor does it engage in the sort of free assembly found in Hurley,
it may not justify its discriminatory behavior under a free association or
free speech argument.
iii. Implicit Right to Exercise One's Conscience-North Coast
Women's Care Medical Group v. Benitez
In North Coast Women's Care Medical Group v. Benitez, 0 the Su-
preme Court of California weighed in on the issue of whether physicians
could decline to provide certain types of medical services for religious
reasons. In Benitez, a woman brought suit against the medical group that
refused to help her become pregnant by intrauterine insemination be-
cause she was a lesbian. 71 The court established early on that "[a] medi-
cal group providing medical services to the public" is indeed considered a
66. Id.
67. Id. at 558.
68. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 558.
69. Id.
70. 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
71. Id. at 964.
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business establishment under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act.72
After summarizing two recent U.S. Supreme Court holdings, 73 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court unanimously found in favor of Benitez, holding
that "a religious objector has no federal constitutional right to an exemp-
tion from a neutral and valid law of general applicability on the ground
that compliance with that law is contrary to the objector's religious
beliefs."74
The doctors responsible for treating Benitez claimed that their free
speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment were violated
when they were sued for refusing to inseminate Benitez.75 The court re-
sponded to this allegation by pointing out that while the doctors were
free to "voice their objections" to the Unruh Civil Rights Act, they were
not free to violate the act without facing consequences. 76 The court then
quoted another California case lending practical support to its assertion:
"For purposes of the [F]ree [S]peech [C]lause, simple obedience to a
law that does not require one to convey a verbal or symbolic mes-
sage cannot reasonably be seen as a statement of support for the law
or its purpose. Such a rule would, in effect, permit each individual to
choose which laws he would obey merely by declaring his agreement
or opposition.""
Thus, a law that simply demands obedience and not an affirmative show-
ing of support may not necessarily trigger First Amendment protections.
In Benitez, the court held that only obedience was required to abide by
the Unruh Civil Rights Act.7 8
The California Supreme Court suggested a caveat of sorts for doctors
seeking to avoid liability for refusing medical treatment on religious
grounds. Justice Kennard, writing for the unanimous court, suggested
that the "defendant physicians can avoid such a conflict [between their
religious beliefs and the Unruh Civil Rights Act] by ensuring that every
72. Id. at 965.
73. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993) (invalidating a city ordinance banning animal slaughter within city limits because
the ordinance impermissibly targeted practitioners of Santeria); Employment Div., Dep't.
of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (concluding that a facially neutral
and generally applicable law banning peyote use could be constitutionally applied to mem-
bers of the Native American Church who sought to use the drug for sacramental
purposes).
74. Benitez. 189 P.3d at 966 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 964.
76. Id. at 967.
77. Id. (quoting Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Dep't of Managed Health
Care, 85 P.3d 67, 89 (Cal. 2004)).
78. Id.
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patient requiring [intrauterine insemination] receives 'full and equal' ac-
cess to that medical procedure through a North Coast physician lacking
defendants' religious objections." 79 The court seemed to suggest that the
medical group could have avoided a lawsuit merely by referring Benitez
to a doctor who did not object to her sexual orientation. But, as discussed
later on in this Comment, the utility of such a solution is limited and may
not be an adequate solution to the problem of discrimination in public
accommodations.
D. Heart of Atlanta v. United States and the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The First Amendment establishes a boundary beyond which the gov-
ernment may not intrude. Given the long history of discrimination in the
United States, lawmakers realized that more protections were needed to
guard against it. Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 196480 in the
wake of the lunch counter sit-ins and other demonstrations during the
1960s."' The act provides: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in
this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race,
color, religion, or national origin." 2 Following the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States affirmed
the validity of the act as it applied to a motel operator in Georgia.83
In Heart of Atlanta, a motel operator argued that by forcing him to rent
rooms to African-Americans, the government deprived him of the right
to run his business as he pleased. 4 The Supreme Court upheld the con-
gressional regulation prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommo-
dations and Congress's finding that such discrimination had a "substantial
and harmful effect" on interstate commerce.85 Thus, the Court in Heart
of Atlanta "upheld the [Clommerce [C]lause section of the Civil Rights
79. Benitez, 189 P.3d at 969.
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2006).
81. GLORIA J. BROWNE-MARSHALL, RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: 1607 To
PRESENT 93 (2007).
82. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006).
83. 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
84. Id. at 243-44. The motel owner argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exceeded
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce and that the motel was:
deprived of the right to choose its customers and operate its business as it wishe[d],
resulting in a taking of its liberty and property without due process of law and a taking
of its property without just compensation; and, finally, that by requiring [the motel] to
rent available rooms to Negroes against its will, Congress [subjected] it to involuntary
servitude in contravention of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Id. at 244.
85. Id. at 258.
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Act, finding that the motel did substantial interstate business when it ac-
cepted out-of-state guests."'8 6 The lasting significance of Heart of Atlanta
is the fact that it empowered other minorities with the legal ammunition
necessary to fight discrimination by privately owned businesses.87
Cases involving racial discrimination are still an issue today, with plain-
tiffs recently bringing lawsuits against several popular hotel and restau-
rant chains accused of discrimination against their customers." While
recent cases such as Elane Photography have not employed Commerce
Clause reasoning, the guiding principles of the opposing parties are the
same-one side asserts a business's right to choose its customers, and the
other side asserts a right not to be subjected to discrimination.
I argue that discrimination based on sexual orientation, like racial dis-
crimination, runs contrary to the cherished American ideals of justice and
equality under the law. The spirit of Heart of Atlanta runs through the
cases involving discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender
identity. Just as business owners have no right to refuse service based on
race, they should not be permitted to use their faith (or any other justifi-
cation) as an excuse for discrimination against LGBT people.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES TO
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
For those states that are hesitant to embrace the LGBT community as a
protected class in their statutes, a more palatable alternative might be
found in limiting the effectiveness of First Amendment defenses to dis-
crimination claims. In order to avoid confusion, public accommodation
statutes must be clearly written, with their exceptions and exclusions
plainly stated. There should be no question that a business like Elane
Photography would be subject to such public accommodations laws since
it is an establishment that offers its services to the public and does not fall
under any of the common statutory exceptions, such as private clubs or
religious institutions. To the extent that individuals engage in acts of
speech, worship, or association, their rights to express their beliefs ought
to be protected. But when that speech or conduct belongs to a business,
the government has a compelling interest in eliminating such invidious
discrimination.89 Some business owners (like Elaine Huguenin) might
86. GLORIA J. BROWNE-MARSHALL. RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: 1607 TO
PRESENT 72 (2007) ("The decision resulted in the desegregation of privately owned busi-
nesses with clear connections to interstate commerce.").
87. Id. at 73.
88. Id. at 74 (discussing lawsuits brought against Cracker Barrel, Denny's, Waffle
House, and the Adam's Mark hotel chain).
89. See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (noting the government's
compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in public accommodations).
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view this as encroaching on their right to free exercise of religion, but I
will show that prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations does
not, in fact, violate business owners' First Amendment rights.
A. Laws Regulate Conduct, Not Beliefs
The Romer Court established that moral disapproval of a certain group
is no excuse to deprive the group's members of their rights. Yet, animus
against the LGBT community has not disappeared, as evidenced by the
many conservative Christian advocacy groups that have emerged with a
mission to combat "the gay agenda."9 ° Many of these groups assert that
any legislation benefitting LGBT people as a class stands in direct conflict
with others' right to freely exercise their religion.9 Since these groups'
interpretation of religious text informs them that homosexuality is im-
moral, they believe that, based on their religious beliefs, they should be
able to refuse service, medical treatment, employment, and other accom-
modations to LGBT people.9 2
It is not the place of the courts to question or validate anyone's relig-
ious views.93 Laws serve to regulate individuals' conduct, not their be-
liefs.94 This rule creates a distinction between what one has a right to
90. E.g., ACIU: Marriage, http://www.aclj.org/issues/Issue.aspx?ID=7# (last visited
Apr. 16, 2010) ("The American Center for Law and Justice is working aggressively to en-
sure that marriage remains a core, societal institution that is not redefined to include any-
thing more than a union between one man and one woman."): ADF: Same-Sex "Marriage"
- Alliance Defense Fund - Defending Our First Liberty, http://www.alliancedefensefund.
org/issues/fraditionalFamily/samesexmarriage.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) ("There is
no more critical battle for our nation's future [than that over same-sex marriage]."); Stand
up for Traditional Marriage! - Christian Coalition of America, http://www.cc.org/olcam-
paign/standtraditional marriage (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) ("[R]adical liberals and gay
activists are working to overturn the will of the people [by overturning state constitutional
amendments banning same-sex marriage].").
91. See, e.g., Focus on the Family's Foundational Values, http://www.focusonthefamily.
com/about-us/guiding-principles.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) ("Christians are called to
proclaim the truth and beauty of God's design and the redemption of sexual brokenness in
our lives and culture through Jesus Christ.").
92. See ADF: Same-Sex "Marriage" - Alliance Defense Fund - Defending Our First
Liberty, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/issues/TraditionalFamily/samesexmarriage.
aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) (claiming that Christians are being asked to compromise
their beliefs in the workplace or face disciplinary action for "refusing to place foster chil-
dren in homosexual households[,] asking to be excused from issuing abortion-inducing
drugs, and many other ... activities").
93. See Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989) ("It is
not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a
faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds."). Rather, the
courts' job is to determine whether legal regulations place a "substantial burden on the
observation of a central religious belief or practice ...." Id.
94. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
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believe and what one has a right to do, in the sense that the former is
essentially unlimited and the latter is subject to government regulation
for the protection of all citizens.95 In accordance with this principle, the
Supreme Court has held that "generally applicable, religion-neutral laws
that have the effect of burdening a particular religious practice need not
be justified by a compelling governmental interest." '96 Laws such as the
California Unruh Civil Rights Act or the New Mexico Civil Rights Act
were not enacted with the intent to violate the religious views of certain
individuals; instead they were put in place to provide protection and a
legal remedy for people who face discrimination in the absence of such
legal protections.
B. Discrimination by Private Clubs Upheld in Certain Circumstances
Some worry that acknowledging LGBT rights under the law is tanta-
mount to forcing tolerance upon an unwilling populace. Hurley, how-
ever, demonstrated that the government has no right to force a private
group to affiliate with others with different or conflicting views.97 This
result came in spite of a Massachusetts public accommodations law for-
bidding discrimination based on sexual orientation.9" The Court justified
its holding by distinguishing between the Veterans Council's rights under
the First Amendment and GLIB's rights under the public accommodation
95. Id. (explaining how conduct may be regulated without burdening essentially con-
stitutional rights). The Court explained:
In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permis-
sible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom. No one would contest the pro-
position that a state may not, [by] statute, wholly deny the right to preach or to
disseminate religious views. Plainly such a previous and absolute restraint would vio-
late the terms of the guarantee. It is equally clear that a state may by general and non-
discriminatory legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting
upon its streets, and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard
the peace, good order and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally in-
vading the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
96. Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 n.3
(1990).
97. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 557 (1995) (upholding the right of the Veterans Council to decide not to allow gays
and lesbians to join its parade).
98. Id. at 572 ("[T]he law today prohibits discrimination on the basis of 'race, color,
religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation .... deafness, blindness or any
physical or mental disability or ancestry' in 'the admission of any person to, or treatment in
any place of public accommodation ... (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch 272, § 98
(West 2009))).
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law.9 9 In cases involving private organizations, such as the Veterans
Council in Hurley or the Boy Scouts in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,'00
courts have allowed discrimination when inclusiveness would undermine
the stated mission of an organization.' 0 ' The courts have justified in-
fringement upon a private club's expressive associational rights only
when there exists a compelling interest in eliminating the discrimination
at issue.' °2
C. We Reserve the Right to Refuse... Medical Treatment?
When discrimination takes place within the context of a public accom-
modation, such as a hospital, the results have been mixed, and many cases
end up settling outside of the courtroom. 1 3. In his concurring opinion in
99. Id. at 572-73. "'While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of
harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promot-
ing an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either
purpose may strike the government." Id. at 579.
100. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) (upholding the Boy Scouts of America's right to termi-
nate a gay scout leader as an act of expressive association); cf. Annie Laurie Gaylor, Boy
Scouts of America Practices Discrimination, FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUND., http://
www.ffrf.org/news/timely-topics/boy-scouts-of-america-practices-discrimination/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 16, 2010) (explaining how, despite openly discriminating against homosexuals,
the Boy Scouts of America operate with the assistance of publicly funded institutions, such
as schools, state parks, and federal buildings); Jon Hurdle, Scouts Group Sues City, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2008, at A19, available at 2008 WLNR 10026998 (reporting that the Boy
Scouts of America are suing the city of Philadelphia, which wants to evict the group from
government-owned premises because of the Boy Scouts' anti-gay policies). Despite receiv-
ing financial benefits from government-funded entities, the Boy Scouts still assert that the
organization is a private club with the right to discriminate against anyone whose beliefs or
actions run contrary to the Boy Scouts' stated mission. Jon Hurdle, Scouts Group Sues
City, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2008, at A19, available at 2008 WLNR 10026998; Mission &
Vision Statements, http://www.scouting.org/about/annualreports/previousyears/2003/mis-
sion.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) ("The mission of the Boy Scouts of America is to
prepare young people to make ethical and moral choices over their lifetimes by instilling in
them the values of the Scout Oath and Law.").
101. Indeed, many proposed and existing discrimination statutes expressly exempt re-
ligious organizations and private clubs. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (2006) (exempting "bona fide private membership club[s]" from compliance);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. § 3(a)(4)(A) (1st
Sess. 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=lll
cong-bills&docid=f:h30l7ih.txt.pdf.
102. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs., Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549
(1987) (concluding that the Rotary Club, a private club, must permit female membership,
even though it might infringe upon the club's free association rights, because the govern-
ment's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women outweighs the bur-
den on the club).
103. E.g., Joint Statement of the Parties upon Settlement of the Case at 1, Benitez v.
N. Coast Women's Care Med. Group, et al., No. GIC 770165 (San Diego Sup. Ct. Sept.
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North Coast Women's Care Medical Group v. Benitez, Justice Baxter
pointed out an interesting problem that the majority did not address. The
majority reasoned that in a group practice, it would be possible for one
doctor to refer his or her patient to someone who would have no objec-
tion to treating the patient. " 4 Thus, doctors would be able to conscien-
tiously object to certain procedures, and patients would still be assured
equal access to treatment. In his concurrence, Justice Baxter asked what
should happen in the case of a sole practitioner who objected for religious
reasons to treating a patient? 10 5 Justice Baxter suggested, "One might
well conclude that, in that situation, application of the Unruh Civil Rights
Act against the doctor would not be the means 'least restrictive' on relig-
ion of furthering the state's legitimate interest." ''"6 This leaves open the
question of why a physician in a group practice should be allowed to dis-
criminate, while a physician in a sole practice cannot.
The Benitez court made the critically important point that "compliance
with a law regulating health care benefits is not speech."' 7 While not
binding in any New Mexico jurisdiction, this observation from the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, nonetheless, carries some interesting implications
when the same reasoning is applied to a case like Elane Photography.
What if obedience to the law does arguably require one to convey a sym-
bolic message, such as that contained in a photograph? Could the New
Mexico Supreme Court find that by forcing Elane Photography to convey
a symbolic message with which Elaine Huguenin disagrees, Huguenin's
free speech and free exercise rights will be violated? The next Part will
explore these issues in greater depth and serve as a guide to courts and
legislative bodies facing this complex and controversial legal issue.
IV. FREE EXERCISE AND FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION
At this point in the analysis, the issue still remains-how should courts
deal with a business that wants to practice what it claims is its owners'
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion? Since there is a lack
of cases directly on point here, it will be necessary to draw inferences
from some of the cases already discussed, in addition to a few others. We
know from Hurley and Dale that private entities that are self-defined with
2009), available at http://data.lambdalegal.org/in-court/downloads/benitez-ca 2090929-
joint-statement-upon-settlement.pdf (ending nine years of litigation over a medical prac-
tice's refusal to provide services to a lesbian couple).
104. Benitez. 189 P.3d at 969.
105. Id. at 971 (Baxter, J., concurring) (questioning "whether the state's interest in
full and equal medical treatment would compel a physician in sole practice to provide a
treatment to which he or she has sincere religious objections").
106. Id.
107. Id. at 967 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
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a certain mission may lawfully exclude individuals whose presence in the
group would undermine that mission. In contrast, many state statutes
prohibit businesses that are considered public accommodations, like the
hospital in Benitez, from discriminating against patrons. But what about
businesses like Elane Photography that are open to the public and wish to
self-identify in a manner similar to a private club or religious institution?
A. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines and the Right of Businesses to Self-
Identify
According to testimony from Elaine and Jonathan Huguenin, Elane
Photography had an "unwritten company policy. .. that Elane Photogra-
phy would not photograph any image or event that was contrary to the
religious beliefs of its co-owners."' 8 The New Mexico Human Rights
Commission's fact findings indicated that Elane Photography also had a
website containing information about Elaine Huguenin, including "her
autobiography, her philosophy and her artistic approach to photogra-
phy."' 10 9 The facts do not indicate whether Elane Photography self-iden-
tified as a Christian business or whether Elaine Huguenin went into detail
regarding her beliefs as a Christian woman on her business's website.It °
This observation leads to two interesting possibilities. If Elane Photogra-
phy did not publicly identify itself as a Christian business, or identify its
owners as Christians, it seems curious that Huguenin's religious beliefs
would only come up when she sought to refuse service to someone based
on those beliefs. If, on the other hand, Elane Photography did publicly
identify itself as a Christian business, the next question is-may a busi-
ness that self-identifies as a "Christian business" discriminate against its
customers based on its owners' religious beliefs?
If Elane Photography or any other public accommodation identifies it-
self as a Christian business, it will likely run into the same problem South-
west Airlines encountered in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines."' As part of
an attempt to boost business in the 1970s, Southwest implemented a win-
ning marketing strategy projecting "an image of feminine spirit, fun, and
sex appeal."' i2 Fostering this image, Southwest chose to only hire attrac-
108. Elane Photography. LLC v. Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, at 4 (Human
Rights Comm'n of N.M. Apr. 4. 2008). available at http://media.npr.org/documents/2008/
jun/photography.pdf (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id.
IIt. 517 F. Supp. 292, 293 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (finding Southwest Airlines liable for sex
discrimination in its policy of only hiring women as flight attendants and ticket agents).
112. Id. at 294. The initial promotion materials for Southwest included the slogan,
"AT LAST THERE IS SOMEBODY ELSE UP THERE WHO LOVES YOU." Id.
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tive females to work as flight attendants and ticket agents.' ' 3 There is no
doubt that this marketing campaign brought success to Southwest.'14
Several men brought suit against Southwest because it refused to em-
ploy them based on their sex.' ' 5 Southwest argued that female sex ap-
peal was a bona fide occupational qualification for the jobs of flight
attendant and ticket agent at Southwest.' 16 The problem with South-
west's policy of only hiring young, sexy, female flight attendants and
ticket agents was that Southwest failed to prove that men could not per-
form the same tasks with the same favorable results.'' 7 Not only did
Southwest fail to offer proof that its customers preferred female flight
attendants over males, Southwest was unable to prove that sex discrimi-
nation in hiring was integral to the future success of its business. '"8
The federal district court articulated a two-part test for determining the
validity of discrimination based on sex: "(1) [D]oes the particular job
under consideration require that the worker be of one sex only; and if so,
(2) is that requirement reasonably necessary to the 'essence' of the em-
ployer's business."'' 9 Southwest ultimately failed the test because the
court focused on "the particular service provided and the job tasks and
functions involved" in running an airline, rather than the successful mar-
keting campaign that gave rise to the alleged "need" to hire only beauti-
ful women in the first place. 211 The court found that Southwest's goals of
"attracting and entertaining male passengers" and "fulfilling customer ex-
pectations" were merely "tangential" to the essence of the job and the
essence of the commercial airline business.12  As the court explained, the
test is "one of business necessity, not business convenience." i22 The bona
fide occupational qualification, as the court made clear, is a narrow ex-
ception that applies in only very few circumstances. 23
A business that self-defines as Christian will likely encounter the same
problem-a court may find its self-identification a business convenience
and not a business necessity. If Christianity is not the essence of the busi-
113. Id. at 295.
114. Id. ("The evidence was undisputed that Southwest's unique, feminized image
played . . . an important role in the airline's success.").
115. Id. at 293.
116. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 293.
117. Id. at 300.
118. Id. at 304.
119. Id. at 299 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 302 n.25.
121. Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
122. Id. at 303.
123. Id. at 304 ("[T]he [bona fide occupational qualification] exception should not be
permitted to 'swallow the rule."' (quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542,
545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
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ness or if being Christian is not necessary to enjoy the services provided
by the business, then it seems that Christian self-identification, like
Southwest Airlines' "sexy" self-identification, will necessarily fail as a de-
fense to discrimination against non-Christian patrons. Furthermore, if a
Christian business alleged that discriminating against certain groups con-
stituted a business necessity, that claim would also fail.124 For evidence,
one need only look to the many religious businesses that are not merely
surviving, but thriving by offering their goods and services to a broad
customer base.' 25 Allowing even a self-identified Christian business to
discriminate would serve only one goal-to sanction and perpetuate the
"invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods"
that the government has a compelling interest to prevent.1
2 6
Thus, Wilson illustrates the problem that arises when a business tries to
self-identify in a manner similar to a private club. In essence, Southwest
tried to create an elite class of beautiful women who could work as flight
attendants or ticket agents.' 2 7 The court found, however, that the exclu-
sion of men from those jobs did nothing to serve the ultimate goal of the
business, which was getting passengers from point A to point B in the
most safe, efficient, and convenient manner.12 8 A business that attempts
to self-identify on religious grounds will face the same legal problems as
Southwest Airlines if it cannot surmount the high hurdle of justifying dis-
crimination as a business necessity and not mere business convenience.
B. Free Exercise and Discrimination on College Campuses
It bears repeating that the law regulates conduct, not beliefs.' 29 Some-
times laws that are enacted to protect certain groups of people will place
a burden on First Amendment free exercise rights.' 3 ° The government
has a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against all Ameri-
124. As a matter of common sense, a commercial business would have a difficult time
arguing that the survival of its enterprise depends on excluding certain groups of customers
from the outset. Generally, businesses grow and thrive by attracting more customers, not
by turning customers away.
125. The list of businesses that successfully maintain a religious image without discrim-
inating against their customers is nearly endless. There are many businesses that are
unapologetically and openly based in faith but do not discriminate.
126. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
127. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 295.
128. Id. at 300.
129. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
130. Cf Hayley Ellison, Free Exercise of the Courtroom: Why Perpetrators of Relig-
iously Motivated Violence Can No Longer Hide Behind the First Amendment, 12 SCHOLAR
95, 123 (2009) (challenging the traditional application of the free exercise defense to shield
religious groups, particularly minority groups, from tort liability for violence committed
against members). Ellison explains:
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cans. '3 Discrimination in public accommodations based on the victim's
religious beliefs (or lack thereof) is already illegal, 32 and discrimination
on other grounds (such as marital status, sexual orientation, or gender
identity) is also illegal in many states. 133 The following two cases demon-
strate how college campuses have dealt with the conflict between First
Amendment free exercise rights and the right to be free from
discrimination.
i. The Status of LGBT Student Groups on Private School
Campuses-Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University
Law Center v. Georgetown University
The District of Columbia prohibits any educational institution from dis-
criminating against individuals "based upon their actual or perceived:
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal ap-
pearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, familial status,
family responsibilities, political affiliation, source of income, or disability
.. 134 This comprehensive statute helps to ensure that educational
institutions will be open to all sorts of people and ideas by preserving
student group access to vital university resources. With this in mind, two
gay rights student groups sued Georgetown University for denying them
"University Recognition," which would entitle them to the many benefits
of registered organization status.' 35 Georgetown felt it was justified in
refusing to extend University Recognition to the student groups, since the
groups presented a challenge to the religious beliefs upon which the uni-
versity was founded. 136
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded that Ge-
orgetown did not have to grant the groups University Recognition and
Particularly in minority religious communities, the risk of internal violence is greatly
magnified by secrecy and exclusivity. In these cases, where the elements of bad con-
duct may be secularly judged for reasonableness without implicating the religious be-
liefs underlying the act itself, the legal system should not excuse violent behavior
simply because it is religiously motivated.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984).
132. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (2006).
133. HRC - Patient Non-Discrimination and State Public Accommodation Law,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/12641.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
134. D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41 (2009) (emphasis added).
135. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
136. Id. at 4-5. Georgetown University is one of the oldest Roman Catholic institu-
tions of higher learning in the United States. Id. at 6. The university's stated mission is:
"Georgetown is committed to a view of reality which reflects Catholic and Jesuit influ-
ences." Id.
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the university's attendant religious endorsement. 37 Instead, the court re-
quired Georgetown to afford the groups all of the tangible benefits
springing from University Recognition, including access to facilities and
services available to other recognized student groups on campus.131 In
justifying its holding, the court explained that while the D.C. Human
Rights Act "does not seek to compel uniformity in philosophical attitudes
by force of law, it does require equal treatment. Equality of treatment in
educational institutions is concretely measured by the nondiscriminatory
provision of access to 'facilities and services.'"
39
Georgetown may be "the nation's oldest Catholic and Jesuit univer-
sity,' 40 but it is also very much like a business. 14 1 If Georgetown Uni-
versity, a religious institution and a piece of American history itself, may
not discriminate based on the core religious values upon which it was
built, why may the owners of Elane Photography?
ii. The Status of Christian Student Groups on Public School
Campuses-Christian Legal Society Chapter of University of
California v. Kane
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to hear the Christian
Legal Society's claim against California.' 4 2 The Supreme Court only
hears a very small percentage of the cases that petition for certiorari, so it
is highly significant that it would decide to weigh in on this issue at this
moment. The question presented in Christian Legal Society Chapter of
University of California v. Kane is whether a public law school can be
compelled to provide recognition and funding to an organization that
openly discriminates against students based on religious affiliation and
sexual orientation. 14 3 In order to become a registered student organiza-
tion, the University of California Hastings College of the Law (Hastings)
requires that student groups comply with the university-wide non-dis-
137. Id. at 5.
138. Id.
139. Id. (quoting D.C. CODE § 1-2520 (1987)) (emphasis in original).
140. Georgetown University: About Georgetown, http://www.georgetown.edu/about.
html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
141. See Board Approves Tuition Increases for 2010-2011, GEORGETOWN.EDU, Mar. 1,
2010, http://explore.georgetown.edu/news/?ID=49130 (stating that Georgetown undergrad-
uate tuition for the 2010-2011 term will be $39,768).
142. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 795, 795 (2009). This case
positions the Court to resolve a circuit split over the issue of whether public schools can be
compelled to fund discriminatory organizations.
143. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, No. C 04-04484 JSW,
2006 WL 997217, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2006), affd, 319 Fed. Appx. 645 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted sub nom. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez. 130 S.Ct. 795
(Dec. 7, 2009) (No. 08-1371).
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crimination policy.' 44 The non-discrimination policy prohibits discrimina-
tion based on "race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability,
age, sex or sexual orientation."14 5
One registered student organizations at Hastings is the Hastings Chris-
tian Legal Society (CLS).' 4 6 In addition to requiring that every member
of the organization sign a "Statement of Faith," the CLS also "bars indi-
viduals who engage in 'unrepentant homosexual conduct' or are members
of religions that have tenets which differ from those set forth in the State-
ment of Faith from becoming members or officers."' 47 After informing
the CLS that its by-laws were not in compliance with the non-discrimina-
tion policy, Hastings withdrew its funding from the CLS.' 48 The CLS
filed suit, claiming, among other things, that its free exercise of religion
rights were violated.' 49
Regarding the free exercise claim, the California district court made
reference to the United States Supreme Court's holding in Employment
Division v. Smith that "a neutral law of general application could prohibit
conduct that was prescribed by an individual's religion and such law did
not have to be supported by a compelling interest." '  Furthermore, the
court found that the non-discrimination policy at Hastings is a neutral
policy of general applicability.' 5 ' Finally, the court reiterated the point so
many courts made before it-the regulation of discrimination on the basis
of religion is not the same as regulating religious beliefs.' Thus, by in-
sisting that student organizations comply with a non-discrimination policy
in order to receive university funding, the university was not telling its
students what to believe-it was merely setting boundaries for their con-
duct. Similarly, state anti-discrimination laws do not tell state citizens
144. Id. at *2.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at *3. The "Statement of Faith" reads:
Trusting in Jesus Christ as my Savior, I believe in:
One God, eternally existent in three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God the
Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth. The Deity of our Lord, Jesus Christ,
God's only Son conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the virgin Mary; His vicarious
death for our sins through which we received eternal life; His bodily resurrection and
personal return. The presence and power of the Holy Spirit in the work of regenera-
tion. The Bible as the inspired Word of God.
Id.
148. Christian Legal Soc'y, 2006 WL 997217, at *3.
149. Id. at *4.
150. Id. at *24 (citing Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885 (1990)).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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how to think; rather, they merely serve to regulate citizens' conduct. The
right to believe whatever one wants to believe is still a sacred right of
each individual that the government cannot take away.
Whatever the Supreme Court decides, its ruling will have a profound
impact on state schools throughout the country. Affirming the lower
court's holding will mean that in order to obtain university funding, the
Christian Legal Society will be required to open its membership to all
students, "even if those individuals disagree with the mission of the
group." '53 Allowing the Christian Legal Society to continue to discrimi-
nate will undermine the spirit of a public school education and the tradi-
tional status of universities as places where diverse opinions and ideas are
shared in a non-threatening environment in which all are welcome.
V. CONCLUSION
State legislatures can help prevent conflict between business owners
and their customers by enacting stronger, clearer, and more expansive
public accommodations statutes. Ideally, these statutes could be modeled
after the New Mexico, 5 ' California, 55 and Massachusetts1 56 statutes,
which include a broad range of protected categories, such as marital sta-
tus, sexual orientation, and gender identity. In order to ensure that a
public accommodation cannot circumvent the law simply by citing the
free exercise rights of its owners, legislatures should clearly identify what
exactly constitutes a public accommodation and what amounts to a relig-
ious or private entity (which would be allowed a First Amendment de-
fense to discrimination claims). These measures will serve two important
interests: (1) the rights of Americans to freely associate, express them-
selves, and practice religion will be protected, and (2) the general public
will be free from arbitrary discrimination in the realm of public
accommodations.
There are several pieces of legislation in the current 111th Congress
that would establish protection for members of the LGBT community,
including the Employment Non-Discrimination Act,' 57 the Military
Readiness Enhancement Act,' 58 and the Domestic Partners Benefit and
153. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 Fed. Appx. 645,
645-46 (9th Cir. 2009).
154. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (West 2009).
155. CAL. CiV. CODE § 51(b) (West 2009).
156. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch 272, § 98 (West 2009).
157. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at hnp://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1 lcong-bills&docid=f:h30l7ih.txt.pdf.
158. H.R. Res. 1283, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 1 lcong-bills&docid=f:h1283ih.txt.pdf.
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Obligations Act.159 If these bills are signed into law, they will provide a
much-needed remedy to American citizens who have faced the precise
type of discrimination the government has a compelling interest to
prevent.
On October 28, 2009, President Obama signed the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 into law.' 60 This important law
contains the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Preven-
tion Act, which carries strict penalties for committing a crime motivated
by hatred of a certain group. 6 ' The Hate Crimes Prevention Act man-
dates that anyone who "willfully causes bodily injury" to someone "be-
cause of the actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability" will face an enhanced sentence
of up to ten years in prison. 62 The punishment could be elevated to life
in prison if the offense results in death or if it involves kidnapping, at-
tempted kidnapping, aggravated sexual abuse, attempted aggravated sex-
ual abuse, or attempted killing.'63
As the first major piece of federal LGBT rights legislation, the Hate
Crimes Prevention Act has generated controversy from some religious
groups alleging that it threatens speech.164 But Attorney General Eric
Holder "has said that any federal hate-crimes law would be used only to
prosecute violent acts based on bias, not to prosecute speech based on
controversial racial or religious beliefs."' 165 Others contend that since
murder and kidnapping are already illegal, a hate crimes law is at best
redundant and at worst a statement that some murders are more egre-
gious than others-and that some victims deserve more justice than
others.'66
159. H.R. 2517, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/billtext.xpd?bill=hlll-2517.
160. H.R. 2647, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.
gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 11 cong-bills&docid=f:h2647enr.txt.pdf.
161. Pub. L. No. M1l-84, 123 Stat. 2190, available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 11 1.cong-bills&docid=f:h2647enr.txt.pdf.
162. Id. § 249(a)(1)(A).
163. Id. § 249(a)(1)(B).
164. Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill into Law, CNN, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.cnn.
com/2009/POLITICS/10/28/hate.crimes/index.html ("Several religious groups have ex-
pressed concern that a hate crimes law could be used to criminalize conservative speech
relating to subjects such as abortion or homosexuality.").
165. Id.
166. Jon Ward, Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill into Law, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009,
at A8, available at 2009 WLNR 21559426. Opponents of the hate crimes law argue that
"because the new law only adds harsher penalties for acts that are already illegal and sub-
ject to criminal prosecution, its main achievement is to move the nation toward the
criminalization of politically incorrect speech." Id. Furthermore, Erik Stanley, senior
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The controversy surrounding the Hate Crimes Prevention Act high-
lights the important distinction between laws regulating beliefs versus
laws regulating conduct. Critics of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act argue
that it unlawfully regulates belief because it punishes criminals more se-
verely because of their motives for committing a certain crime. 67 In re-
sponse, Congress offered a justification for why hate crimes warrant
harsher punishment than other crimes not motivated by bias against an
identifiable group:
A prominent characteristic of a violent crime motivated by bias is
that it devastates not just the actual victim and the family and friends
of the victim, but frequently savages the community sharing the traits
that caused the victim to be selected.168
In other words, hate crimes are worthy of distinction because they victim-
ize an entire group of people in a community, not just one individual.169
Laws that permit business owners to discriminate can have a similar
impact on members of the group facing discrimination. 7 ' In Heart of
Atlanta, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, finding that discrimination by public accommodators
had a stifling effect on interstate commerce." 7' Put bluntly, when people
fear for their safety and the safety of their families, they will be less likely
to travel through areas where they feel unwelcome or unsafe.' 72 Con-
gress offered similar justifications for the Hate Crimes Prevention Act,
finding that violent crimes motivated by bias substantially affect inter-
state commerce in several ways-by impeding the movement of members
of the targeted group or forcing them to leave their communities out of
fear of violence, by preventing them from obtaining the goods and ser-
vices they need, and by hindering their ability to seek employment.' 73
counsel for the Alliance Defense Fund, has stated, "'Bills of this sort are designed to for-
ward a political agenda and silence critics, not combat actual crime."' Id.
167. Id. (summarizing the views of critics of the hate crimes law who argue that the
law punishes "politically incorrect speech").
168. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act § 4702(5)
(emphasis added).
169. Matthew Shepard Foundation: Our Story Main Page, http://www.matthewshep-
ard.org/site/PageServer?pagename=OurStory-Main-Page (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
170. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Vanessa Willock, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685, at 8
(Human Rights Comm'n of N.M. Apr. 4, 2008), available at http://media.npr.org/docu-
ments/2008/jun/photography.pdf (relating Vanessa Willock's testimony that she "was
shocked, angered and saddened" to receive Huguenin's reply to her email inquiry). Wil-
lock testified that she "was also fearful, because she considered the opposition to same-sex
[marriage] to be so blatant." Id. at 6.
171. Heart of Atlanta Motel. Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
172. Id. at 253.
173. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act § 4702(6).
20101
THE SCHOLAR
Still, critics insist that legislation like the Hate Crimes Prevention Act
threatens free exercise of religion.' 74 This could not be further from the
truth. The Hate Crimes Prevention Act explicitly states:
Nothing in this division shall be construed to prohibit any constitu-
tionally protected speech, expressive conduct or activities (regardless
of whether compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief),
including the exercise of religion protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States and peaceful
picketing or demonstration. The Constitution of the United States
does not protect speech, conduct or activities consisting of planning
for, conspiring to commit, or committing an act of violence. 5
If the "speech" that critics of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act are wor-
ried about consists of beating someone to death because of his sexual
orientation, 176 then perhaps the Hate Crimes Prevention Act is cause for
concern. Otherwise, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act preserves the right
to still think and believe freely. The role of the government is to step in
when that thought or belief manifests itself through violent conduct.
A law that protects individuals from discrimination in public accommo-
dations would have a similar form and effect as the Hate Crimes Preven-
tion Act. Such a law would not be enacted for the purpose of burdening
free exercise, but instead to promote free and equal access to public ac-
commodations for all Americans. It would not require business owners
to go out of their way to hire LGBT people, nor would it force them to
change their mission statement or business philosophy. Such a law would
merely prohibit business owners from denying potential customers access
to goods and services based on their own personal prejudices, and it
would promote the government's compelling interest in ending
discrimination.
The struggle for equality does not have to be a "zero-sum game" with
"one winner and one loser."' 177 Recognizing the rights of certain disen-
franchised groups does not mean that religious liberties must be sacri-
174. Jon Ward, Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill into Law, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009,
at A8, available at 2009 WLNR 21559426.
175. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act § 4710(6).
176. Matthew Shepard Foundation: Our Story Main Page, http://www.matthewshep-
ard.org/site/PageServer?pagename=Our-Story-Main-Page (last visited Apr. 16, 2010)
(describing the horrific murder of Matthew Shepard, an openly gay college student, in
Wyoming in 1998).
177. Karla Dial, Everyday Heroes, CIiIZENLINK, http://www.citizenlink.org/FOSl/ho-
mosexuality/hgeducation/A000009883.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010) ("Clearly, when the
pro-gay juggernaut collides with religious liberty, there will be one winner and one loser.
This is a zero-sum game.").
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ficed. The same principle that protects religious expression also protects
LGBT people: that, as Americans, we should not have to deny who we
are in order to receive equal treatment under the law.178
178. ADF: CLS, ADF Attorneys Available to Media Following Oral Argument at
U.S. Supreme Court Monday - Alliance Defense Fund - Defending Our First Liberty,
http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/story.aspx?cid=5271 (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
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